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Abstract 
Why has FRONTEX evolved without introducing a mechanism for legal 
accountability? This case study answers this question by examining relevant 
treaties and regulations concerning FRONTEX's mandate, as well as previous 
scholarship in the area – and applying a top down approach to explain the 
evolution of FRONTEX's development. The study goes beyond focusing on 
FRONTEX's role as an intelligence agency, and instead applies a neofunctional 
theoretical framework to account for its evolution in the capacity of an EU 
Agency. The examination of the material reveals operations and a legal 
framework with an intertwined character, and how this complicates accountability 
when the Agency operates on Member State territory. The main findings indicate 
that a discourse of national competences and sovereignty has been retained 
throughout interventions as well as in the legal framework that the EU has set for 
FRONTEX, proving intergovernmental elements in the evolution of EU border 
management. There has been national reluctance towards the Agency operating on 
Member State borders. This, in combination with functional spillover of 
integration and technocratic elements, related to its managerial role, has provided 
the Agency with an unclear framework that makes it possible to experiment and 
take over Member States' responsibilities when it comes to border management, 
without being held accountable for it. 
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1. Introduction  
In February 2012 Italy was held accountable before the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) for violation of Human Rights. The case concerned the 
interception of 24 Eritrean and Somali nationals in 2009. The migrants were 
heading for Italy on the high seas, but stopped in the Maltese Search and Rescue 
Zone and escorted back to Libya from where they had left for the European Union 
(EU). The case, known as Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy, was described by 
Amnesty International as historical. EU Member States have faced accusations 
before for pushing back migrants, directly violating the principle of non-
refoulement established in the Geneva Convention. This, however, is the first case 
of Member State conviction (Amnesty International, 2012). Nevertheless, Italy 
was not the only actor involved in the interception. Amnesty fails to mention The 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External 
Borders of the Member States of the European Union, also known as FRONTEX. 
In fact, the ECHR expressed perplexity in their judgment – about the Agency's 
role where it participates in operations:  
 
The Assembly is concerned about the lack of clarity regarding the 
respective responsibilities of European Union States and FRONTEX 
and the absence of adequate guarantees for the respect of fundamental 
rights and international standards in the framework of joint operations 
coordinated by that agency. 
(Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy, ECHR) 
 
This statement also reflects the concern that the framework of responsibilities 
does not ensure Human Rights and respect the Geneva Convention. Human Rights 
Watch (2009) observed FRONTEX assistance and coordination in some of the 
interceptions made in the Mediterranean in 2009. However, it was not possible to 
prove in which operations the Agency was involved. The lack of evidence from 
humanitarian organizations led to a conviction against Italy solely.  
Rejection of accountability and responsibility from FRONTEX's side has 
upset politicians and public officials seeing the Agency as partially or fully 
responsible for the operations where it is involved. In 2013 the EU ombudsman 
Emily O'Reilly demanded the Agency set up an internal mechanism where 
migrants would be able to file complaints in case of a breach of their rights. The 
initiative was rejected. Instead, FRONTEX referred to national authorities for 
legaltresponsibilityt(euobserver,t2013).
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1.1 Research purpose and questions  
It seems paradoxical that EU Member States would want to engage with an EU 
agency that does not assume legal responsibility for its actions on their own 
sovereign territory. While FRONTEX-coordinated efforts have so far only led to 
Member State conviction, the Agency has participated actively with operational 
personnel. In the light of FRONTEX's active role in the management of EU 
Member States' external borders, it is necessary to examine what defines its 
mission and what legal mandate it has been given, to determine how this 
corresponds to its activities. The aim of this study is that this examination will 
answer the following question:  
 
Why has FRONTEX evolved without introducing a mechanism for legal 
accountability?  
 
To answer this question, a categorization of the Agency's activities within a 
theoretical framework will have to be done. It is the assumption of this study that 
a top-down approach might be applicable (for further discussion see 4.1.1 A least 
likely case). This leads to the following question: 
 
Can neofunctional theoretical concepts explain why FRONTEX's mandate has 
evolved without accountability? 
1.1.1 Disposition  
 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters. Firstly, definitions of FRONTEX:s work 
and key terms used in the thesis will be provided. Secondly, a background 
concerning the area of migration policy within the EU will be presented. In the 
fourth chapter, I intend to deliberate on Methodology and Material. In the fifth 
section, a brief overview of earlier research of relevant to this thesis is given. The 
theoretical framework guiding the investigation is ventilated in the sixth part, 
upon which the analysis follows in the seventh chapter. The study will finish with 
a final discussion.  
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2. Definitions 
2.1 Defining FRONTEX's work 
In order to answer the guiding research question, FRONTEX's activities need to 
be classified and categorized. The Agency started in 2005 conducting risk analysis 
on the external borders of the EU, and the organization describes their own 
activities as “intelligence-driven”, risk analysis being ”the starting point for all 
Frontex activities” (FRONTEX, 2015).  
The information the Agency gathers and processes is made publicly available 
on request, in accordance to Article 4 (1) (a) of Regulation No. 1049/2001 
regulating public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission 
Documents. For the purpose of a pre-investigation, the author requested the 
material from Joint Operational Plans (JOP's) prepared for the operations carried 
out in Greece between 2010 and 2014. The JOP's were made available, but 
information about where and how the operations were planned, as well as which 
Member States participated, was censored. The censorship finds legal support an 
exception in the same EU law (EC) 1049/2001 that regulates public access, but in 
reference to “public security” since the information is believed to be of use to 
drug smugglers and human traffickers). The secrecy surrounding the risk analysis 
assembled by the Agency meets the definitions of intelligence introduced by 
Björn Fägersten (2010). Notwithstanding, FRONTEX also coordinates and 
participates in border watching operations. The Agency's mandate reaches beyond 
the production of intelligence, as it is also an operational agency part of the Home 
Affairs area established in 1992.
1
 FRONTEX was established on the initiative of 
the European Commission, with the objective of ensuring an integrated border 
management. The Commission deemed insufficient the national authorities in 
charge of managing the external borders of the EU and Schengen (Commission 
3a, 4). The Commission's idea of an integrated border management stretches 
beyond security. It is a political initiative from the Commission and a theory of 
how the EU works might be applicable to its development. 
                                                 
1 
Other agencies constituting Home Affairs being: Europol, CEPOL; EMCDDA; EASO and eu-LISA (EC, 2015)  
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2.2 Definition of key terms 
For the purpose of a clear investigation containing terms possible to 
operationalize, the following key notions needs to be defined: 
 
 Accountability – is ”ensuring that officials in public, private and voluntary 
sector organisations are answerable for their actions and that there is redress 
when duties and commitments are not met” according to Transparency & 
Accountability Initiative (2015). It is crucial that it is in some form 
institutionalized. This could, for instance, be the demand for an internal system 
in FRONTEX by the EU ombudsman Emily O'Reilly. Thereby, ”one set of 
people/organisations are held to account (‘accountees’), and another set do the 
holding (‘accounters’)” (TAI, 2015).  
 
 Supranationalism – a clear definition is provided by Roberta Mungianu: 
“Supranationalisation describes the shift from intergovernmental cooperation to 
the supranational exercise of power by centralised EU governmental structures 
on policy areas within the territory of the Member States as a consequence of the 
conferral of power on the EU by the Member States within those policy areas” 
(2013: 369). 
 
 Intergovernmentalism – negotiations and cooperation that occur between 
national governments. Also a theory that targets governments as the prime actors 
in EU negotiations (cf. Rosamond 2000).  
 
 Technocracy – is defined by Oxford Dictionaries as “The government or control 
of society or industry by an elite of technical experts” (OD 2015). 
 
All of the above-mentioned definitions will be employed in the analysis, and 
further definitions follow in Theory (section 6) 
 
 Integrated border management (IBM) – Mungianu (2013: 365) defines this 
broadly as the strategy (as part of Justice and Home affairs) introduced by the 
EU to integrate ”criminal law, policing, expulsion, customs cooperation and 
internal security”. 
 
 Irregular migrants – migrants who have entered EU territory unlawfully. 
 
 Push-backs – when migrants are forced to turn around at the borders an EU 
Member State without getting the right to file an application for asylum (which 
violates the Geneva Convention).  
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3. Setting the context: security and a 
decrease in migration  
Border management is controversial, as it often deals with exposed people fleeing 
oppression and war. Humanitarian organizations such as Human Rights Watch 
have reported on migrants trying to get to the EU being pushed back on the high 
seas before they reach EU territory, thereby being denied the right to a proper visa 
application. In some operations where the Agency is involved, accusations of 
using push-backs as a method have been made. Examples of this are the 
interventions on the Greek border towards Turkey initiated in 2010 (Human 
Rights Watch, 2011) and the Joint Operation HERA III in 2008 off the West 
African Coast (Carrera et al. 2013: 345). The same allegations have been made 
against the on-going Triton. The current operation replaced the financially 
stronger Italian operation Mare Nostrum, and Triton has been accused of shifting 
focus from saving migrants to protecting borders. In this, Amnesty International 
(2014) alleges the operation to ”put the lives of thousands of migrants and 
refugees attempting to reach Europe at risk”. 
3.1 Securitizing 'Fortress Europe' 
Numerous scholars have depicted the evolution of the area of migration policy in 
the EU as a step in the process of 'securitization', a process which attempts to 
connect migration to potential threats and risk and thereby characterizing it as a 
security matter (cf. Huysmans 2000; Neil 2009; Léonard 2009). The area of 
migration policies in European countries started to become a public concern in the 
1960s and 1970s. Migration policies before this had in most European countries 
been generous when it came to accepting a high degree of flexible labor migration 
from so called 'third countries' (countries outside the European Community). In 
this time however, legislation passed that distinguished between how Member 
State nationals and foreigners of the EU could move within the Union. This was 
primarily done to open up the internal market to labor from all Member States, 
thereby linking migration within the EU to economic policy while separating 
immigrants from non-EU countries from it. It has been argued that this was the 
first key to establishing what is referred to as 'Fortress Europe' (Huysmans, 2000: 
754).  
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 The expression 'Fortress Europe' refers to the political stance the EU with 
its Member States has taken to limit the legal options as a migrant to reside on EU 
territory. This includes diminishing internal borders while strengthening  external, 
making it harder to get asylum or to get legal access to the EU job market as a 
labor migrant (Roos 2013: 10-11). The focus on the external borders of the 
Member States was consolidated by the establishment of the Schengen agreement 
in 1995. Abolition of border checks inside the Schengen area made the focus shift 
towards the external borders of the new Schengen area, and increased control of 
the outer borders was motivated with a security discourse (EC, 2015). For 
instance, according to FRONTEX one of the key motivations for its establishment 
was dealing with “organised crime networks” (FRONTEX, 2014). Schengen 
establishment and FRONTEX's role in the protection of its borders is part of a 
bigger picture. Since the 1980s a general discourse has been establishing on EU 
level that frames migration together with other security issues, such as human 
trafficking. Jef Huysmans argues that this is part of a 'security discourse' setting 
its way into European politics, linking migration to among other things 
transnational crime and terrorism (2000: 756). Parts of public administration – 
mainly the police in several European countries – were strong advocates of 
Schengen. Their interest was establishing supranational control over border 
management. The organized interests from different levels of European society to 
regulate migration had a profound effect on the European legal framework.  
 In 1992 the policy area 'Justice and Home Affairs' (JHA) was founded as 
part of three central 'pillars' of policy in which the EU legislates and forms policy. 
The priority for everything regarding asylum and refugees, as well as 
immigration, was transferred to the first pillar of interest in the The Treaty of 
Amsterdam which entered into force in 1999, replacing the JHA with the area 
Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) (Huysmans 2000: 755p).  
3.2 The EU's material aims in border            
management  
The EU has coordinated efforts mainly in the area of border management focusing 
on control. This is illustrated by the shape which the Dublin Convention has 
taken. The Convention makes it impossible to apply for asylum in any other EU 
country than the one to which the migrant first arrives. Although the process is 
more definite because of the administration in the Member State only treating the 
application once, it also makes it harder to be granted asylum since the migrant 
only has a single chance. Visa policies have also been harmonized between 
Member States in order to achieve full EU control of who gets asylum and how 
the conditions set apply in every single case (Huysmans 2000: 756). The Dublin 
Regulation was introduced to make the asylum application process easier for both 
migrants as well as Member States (Ibid.; europa.eu, 2015). 
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 Huysmans argues that the security policies (that FRONTEX is a part of) at 
the borders has motivated EU authorities to prioritize technical expertise. Border 
guards are a part of a corps of professional security personnel, and their given 
mission implies the handling of migrants as a potential security threat (2000: 757). 
The EU's agenda at the external borders aims at reducing irregular migration, 
which has been policy since the establishment of the Dublin Convention. A 
primary strategy used is restricting the number of people entering the Union, 
making it harder to get a visa (Ibid: 756). Another strategy is to externalize the 
border, by making readmission agreements with third countries (Pollak and 
Slominski 2009: 916). Both strategies have created further incentives for border 
guard authorities to force migrants crossing the border to turn back (Ibid.).  
3.3 Double mandate for FRONTEX  
The establishment of FRONTEX as an overarching EU authority is a result of the 
European Commission's will for an integrated border management (IBM) along 
all external border of the Union. The Agency was established in 2004. The policy 
of an IBM aims at providing a uniform standard of control at all external borders 
of the Union, independent of which is the Member State. The role of FRONTEX 
is described in its founding regulation as supportive in ensuring the management 
of external borders: it serves as an extension of national border management. This 
is clearly expressed in the 4
th
 paragraph (EC) 2007/2004 where the EC states that 
“The responsibility for the control and surveillance of external borders lies with 
the Member States.” Is this a paradox? With regard to the EC:s aim of common 
standards along the external borders, and the establishment of an Agency to 
ensure this, taking responsibility for what the Agency does could be considered 
fundamental (cf. Human Rights Watch, 2011).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lund University   STVA21 
Department of Political Science                                                                        Samuel Williams 
 
8 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1 The single case 
This study classifies as a theory testing qualitative case study (cf. Esaiasson et al., 
2007; Teorell & Svensson 2007). As Esaiasson et al. argues, theory testing case 
studies have the aim of testing a theoretical framework on a given case, and the 
theory is central to the entire investigation. Further, the choice of conducting this 
type of study implies that strong reasons exist for the choices of a specific 
theoretical framework and the specific case to which it will be applied (2007: 42). 
In the following section I will explain the underlying hypothesis and assumptions 
motivating research on the case of FRONTEX and why a neofunctional lens 
might best account for the case. Single case studies that examine only one unit of 
analysis are rare. However, this study classifies as one. No segregation will be 
made between period of time during which FRONTEX has evolved, and the 
investigation circle around the case as one entity (Esaiasson et al. 2007: 121).  
4.1.1 A least likely case 
The choice of this case is made on the basis of its extreme character. Border 
management is the policy area where sovereign states are least likely to give up 
control to a supranational body (the EU). To control who is allowed to reside on 
the land controlled by a state is referred to as “one of the key functions” of the 
exertion of power of a modern state (Roos 2013: 1). This is why the area where 
states should find hardest to compromise their influence is regarding territorial 
sovereignty. If sovereignty is compromised here where it is least likely to do so, it 
might be the case that supranationalism in the form of Europeanization is taking 
over in other policy areas too (Teorell and Svensson 2007: 154). If it proves to be 
correct that this will not however be subject to examination in this study. 
The unlikelihood of migration policies to be handled primarily by the EU has 
been further expressed, as these policies also touch upon vital areas such as 
provision of the welfare sector and access to the labor market (Roos 2013: 10). 
The EU has launched cooperation and integration in numerous areas where states 
benefit from it, such as the common market. However, by letting FRONTEX as an 
EU agency – employing staff from most Member States – operate on its soil, 
Member States are partially giving up on their sovereignty. Therefore, according 
to sovereign logic, migration policy which touches on borders and territory should 
not be an area of EU intervention (Roos 2013; Mungianu 2013).  
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Yet, is this an important case for anyone else apart from scholars focusing on EU 
integration? As allegations against FRONTEX for violating Human Rights are 
frequent and the Agency assumes no legal responsibility, every person interested 
in the safeguarding of Human Rights should be puzzled by the Agency. 
4.1.2 Scope and delimitations 
This study cannot be generalized to other empirical cases. The examination of a 
single case (one Agency) is not applicable to, for instance, the other agencies 
within Home Affairs. The aim of this study in methodological terms is to 
generalize theoretically. What this means is that the examination does not have 
the ambition of explaining several cases in the EU where neofunctional elements 
exist. Rather, the ambition is to tie the case of FRONTEX to the neofunctional 
theory and thereby connect this case to neofunctional school of thought. If the 
theory is relevant, connecting it to the  material will provide an applied example 
of empirical support for the theoretical discourse used by neofunctionalists 
(Teorell and Svensson 2007: 44).  
4.1.3 Hypothesis and counterfactual thinking  
Focusing on a single organization and single theory risks to make the 
investigation one-sided and possibly even biased by the material. Therefore, it is 
of vital importance to keep a counterfactual thinking – to keep focus on what the 
situation would be like if FRONTEX was not a case of supranational influence 
(Teorell and Svensson 2007: 236). If this thinking is not sustained, the analysis 
risks telling “only one side of the story”. To be clear about which side of the story 
this analysis will focus on, it is crucial to have an intersubjective approach to the 
underlying hypothesis. This also makes it possible to formulate a counterfactual 
thinking. The theory that will be presented below is about supranational rule. It 
explains how the supranational organization (EU) takes over governance at the 
expense of Member States. Building on the line of reasoning established in 4.1.1 
about state sovereignty, this study launches with the hypothesis that Member 
States might not have been the most influential actors in decisions about 
FRONTEX's evolution – establishing its mission and mandate. Therefore 
neofunctionalism is tested as an explaining theory.  
A counterfactual thinking instead places emphasis on the power of 
Member States' governments. It implies that Member States would have the power 
to either establish an agency and legislation (1) that takes responsibility for its 
activities on equal terms as the Member States involved in operations, or (2) that 
allows for Member States' to be able to circumvent responsibility and thereby 
avoid accountability as FRONTEX on equal terms as does. This because it does 
not lie in the interest of Member States to be held accountable when FRONTEX is 
not. This counterfactual thinking will be kept throughout the analysis. 
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4.2 Material 
How has the material been selected? In analyzing the Agency's path to where it is 
today, a considerable amount of work has already has been done. These secondary 
sources themselves rely on tremendous previous investigation. For the purpose of 
the research field and of this investigation, it is important to work cumulatively.  
 The extensive work of Carrera & Guild (2010), Carrera et al., (2013), 
Pollak & Slominski (2009) and Christof Roos (2013) will be used among others. 
Some of the information from the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) come 
from Roberta Mungianu (2013). As for other relevant legislation concerning 
FRONTEX, the following regulations will be analyzed:  
 
 Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 – establishing FRONTEX 
 Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 – creating a mechanism for operational intervention (in 
the form of Rapid Border Intervention Teams) 
 Regulation (EC) No 1168/2011 – giving the Agency the authority to initiate operations 
4.3 Operationalization and strategic approach 
The expectation of this study is that a combination of the defined key terms (in 
section 2.2) and the theoretical definitions (in section 5) along with a clear 
hypothesis and counterfactual thinking (section 4.1.3) will convince the reader 
that a sound investigation in terms of operationalization is taking place. 
Operationalization of the concepts mentioned above will lead to the examination 
of both (1) FRONTEX's allocated legal mandate, and (2) how this corresponds to 
its actions. The benefit of this intensive single case study is that it gives the 
researcher the possibility of using a variety of sources to illustrate the evolution of 
FRONTEX.  
 The strategy used for this investigation is simple and thereby easy to 
reproduce from an intersubjective perspective. To analyze legislation is a way of 
distinguishing (1) which political objectives that are underlying in the creation of 
legislation, and (2) what legal mandate is given to an authority and how it is 
delimited. I will use relevant treaties and regulations that regulate FRONTEX and 
compare them to (1) the empirical cases where FRONTEX has intervened on 
Member State territory and how this corresponds to its legal mandate, and (2) how 
the interpretations and implementations of its legal mandate are carried out. This 
will be complemented with contributions of previous research, which is 
indispensable for cumulative research.   
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5. Previous research  
Many authors have pointed to the lack of accountability in the FRONTEX 
authority (cf. Carrera and Guild 2010; Pollak and Slominski 2009; Mungianu 
2013). Carrera et al. (2013) have partially examined the legal framework and its 
ties to the discourse adopted in relation to the Agency's operations. Björn 
Fägersten (2010) has focused on incentives of EU Member States to cooperate 
intergovernmentally when it comes to intelligence. Migration policy and its links 
to sovereignty has been explored by Christof Roos (2013) in his book The EU and 
Immigration Policies Cracks in the Walls of Fortress Europe?, where the 
difficulties of sovereign states to cooperate due to issues of regulation of internal 
markets and welfare systems are thoroughly treated. Jef Huysmans (2000) has 
contributed to the literature on securitization in his article The European Union 
and the Securitization of Migration. All these academics' scholarship has proven 
useful to this study. The two latter scholars have provided an extensive 
background to the context in which FRONTEX operates. However, none of the 
above-mentioned scholars have made an exhaustive examination of the 
neofunctional frameworks possible links to FRONTEX developments. The 
scholarship on FRONTEX has made tremendous progress in terms of mapping 
The Agency's unclear mandate. Nevertheless the cases in which FRONTEX has 
been involved and the legislation determining their mandate calls for new 
theoretical framing. This study begins with the assumption there must exist a 
reason for the unclarity surrounding the Agency's mandate.
 12 
 
6. Theory  
As Martin Saeter points out, although the EU with its institutions is a complex and 
multi-faceted organization, it is an entity, and therefore it would be fruitful to 
analyze parts of the organization with a comprehensive theory. To understand the 
development going on in different branches of the bigger EU-tree, a general 
approach needs to be adopted (1998: 12-13). It is the aim of this chapter to present 
a theory with the potential of explaining FRONTEX's emergence and 
development as an EU Agency. Since FRONTEX's mission stretches beyond 
Björn Fägersten's definition of intelligence and coordinates as well as participates 
actively in operations, this study suggests looking beyond intelligence theory and 
look at the Agency's mission with another theoretical understanding. This is done 
by examining the evolution of its mandate while applying a theory concerned with 
EU institutional development: neofunctionalism. It does so by explaining EU 
integration from the top down. 
6.1 Neofunctionalism  
Neofunctionalism explains the EU's development through its institutions. 
Although the neofunctionalist theory has been criticized and revised since the first 
lines were sketched by Ernst Haas in 1958, the central causal theoretical queries 
have guided many empirical studies of the ECSC, the EEA and finally the EU, 
and many scholars have contributed to its development. Since the beginning this 
theory has had generalizing ambitions, and researchers have applied it to 
empirical cases with the goal of connecting this theory of self-reinforcing 
integration – to every case of negotiation of sovereignty in the EU (Rosamond, 
2000:f54).
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6.1.1 Establishment of the supranational level  
The central term used by neofunctionalists to depict the EU project is 
supranationalism. What is important to the theory is that the creation of 
institutions on the EU level generates further integration which decreases the 
influence of Member States. The creation of common institutions enhances 
technocracy and spurs spillover motivated with functionality (see 6.1.2, 6.1.3 and 
6.1.4 for further elaboration). It describes the EU as an organization that places 
power in a technocratic elite, ruling Member States from above. These technocrats 
are Europeanized in interests, in loyalty and thereby also in policy design 
(Rosamond 2000: 56).  
 
 
1                                  2                                  3                                    4                                  5 
+ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + 
Intergovernmental                                                                                                 Supranational    
politics                                                                                                                             politics                                  
 
Figure 1. Presented here to illustrate the ontological span between intergovernmental and supranational theories,  
where neofunctionalism belongs far to the right on the continuum. Source: Stone Sweet & Sandholtz, 1997: 303.  
6.1.2 Spillover  
A central idea to neofunctionalism is that the process of cooperation can by itself 
generate further and enhanced cooperation. This suggests that institutions 
themselves create a spurring force, called spillover. Once cooperation has been 
established in an institution, the institutionalization leads cooperation to deepen 
(Fägersten, 2010: 93). Theory focusing on spillover in the organization exists far 
from rationalist theories on the ontological spectrum. Rather than considering the 
decisions and actors related to intergovernmental cooperation, the institutions and 
authorities where cooperation happens are targeted and the social arena where 
cooperation in an organization takes place is given importance. This theoretical 
approach is based on an assumption of automaticity. As Fägersten puts it: 
“solutions in one policy area require additional action in an adjacent policy area” 
(2010: 94).  
 According to this line of thought, the coordinating role of FRONTEX 
where Member States' efforts and personnel are gathered will automatically 
demand more active cooperation where the Agency works: analysis related to 
intelligence and coordination of operations at the external borders. This is closely 
linked to the concept of functionality or functional spillover. It suggests that the 
fulfillment of a goal will require cooperation to spread to more policy areas, 
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making it a necessity related to the functioning of the organization and its 
objectives (Ibid.). What drives integration in the EU economy and policy is 
consequently common institutions. This dynamic has two aspects: functionality 
and political will.  
6.1.3 Functionality 
Functionality is what motivates institutions to deepen their cooperation and widen 
the scope of their activities. As different sectors and policy areas (such as 
migration policies) are interconnected and institutionalized (in the case of 
FRONTEX), neofunctionalists argue that institutions will want to engage in more 
cooperation within their policy area to increase their capabilities. This has been 
the case with the common inner market in the EU, where trade barriers have 
gradually been removed to assure the market's prosperity. It is part of the spillover 
effect, since the first institutional establishments will generate an increasing 
mandate. Evidently, the theory focuses more on directly supranational institutions 
and their powers of initiation, the European Commission being the best example 
as it is an agenda-setting institution without any dependence on Member States' 
interests (Rosamond 2000: 60-61). The most important element in integration on 
the supranational level is independent institutions with the powers of initiation. In 
this, institutions such as the EC must be powerful enough to be able to bypass the 
preferences of Member States that might prove averse to integration in some 
policy areas. Or as Haas puts it:  
 
There is no dependable, cumulative process of precedent formation leading to 
ever more community-oriented organizational behavior, unless the task 
assigned to the institution is inherently expansive, thus capable of 
overcoming the built-in autonomy of functional contexts and of surviving 
changes in the policy aims of the Member States 
(in Rosamond 2000: 62) 
 
This means that an institution or authority within the EU can, if given a task that 
implies broadening the scope of its activities, do so by itself. For that to happen 
however, a political will is needed that provides a goal. In the case of the EU, this 
goal has been more supranational control over more policy areas. To assure this 
goal cooperation is required and thereby the EU authority motivates further 
cooperation as a means to assure the functioning of the idea. Institutions and 
authorities are occupied with the general goal of gaining more power in their 
respective policy areas. By creating supranational bodies working for the greater 
good of the EU as a whole, the high authority becomes independent in the sense 
that it operates independently of national preferences. Supranational institutions 
equal independent supranational political will, which sees to the interests of the 
EU as a whole, which is vital (Ibid). Thereby, national power and state-centrism 
turns obsolete when EU institutions are given influence (Rosamond 2000: 77).  
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6.1.4 Technocracy 
Do functional arguments in any sense replace the ideological debate regarding 
how the EU should develop? Neofunctional theory suggests that it does, and that 
this is partly because of increased technocratic influence over politics. The 
creation of a European Union, is argued to be more about the guarantee of 
material needs than about ideology. National and EU issues such as foreign policy 
are issues that are best handled by public officials: the technocrats. This inspires 
the entire construction of the EU with its institutions and authorities (Rosamond 
2000: 57).  
6.1.5 Treaties pushing integration  
The goals that are set up in the economic and political spheres of the EU come 
from Member States as well as the European Council and European Commission. 
These actors all have different preferences and motives for the outcomes of 
policy-making. However, according to P.C. Schmitter, when goals are not shared, 
the only development that the institutionalized EU framework will lead to is 
further integration. This can happen either by increasing the scope in the number 
of sectors where cooperation takes place, or an intensification of cooperation in 
the existing sectors (in Rosamond 2000: 63). The enlargement of the number of 
participating countries at the same time as deepening of EU integration is 
something that has by some been considered as opposing trends (Chopin, 2007). 
In the neofunctionalist account they are only considered complementary to each 
other. The treaties signed by Member States for European cooperation are also of 
a definitive nature. Once a Treaty is signed, actors in the economic and political 
field adapt to the new institutions, or new areas of influence assigned to old 
institutions. This prevents incentives that Member States might have to keep the 
cooperation from interfering too much with their powers (Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz 1997: 312-313).  
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7. The Agency's evolution 
The following analysis will be organized according to five different themes. As 
this study considers the invention of and changes in FRONTEX and its 
capabilities, the analysis will follow these changes and analyze their implications, 
without following a strict chronology, instead, the causality in the evolution of  
FRONTEX's mandate will be reflected by the division into themes. The material 
has been analyzed according to potential relevance for the neofunctional 
framework and for a counterfactual outcome. With these theoretical concepts in 
mind, the purpose is answering the question: Why has FRONTEX evolved 
without introducing a mechanism for legal accountability?  
7.1 Gradual evolution of mandate 
Several Member States have all along the development of the integrated border 
strategy been reluctant to the measures of its implementation. Implementation 
requires EU involvement on state territory, with the risk of clashing with the 
principle of subsidiarity which supports state sovereignty. Subsidiarity assumes 
that Member States' should handle every matter that is not better handled on EU 
level (Carrera & Guild 2010: 12). FRONTEX has circumvented this principle by 
active experimentation in areas beyond the Agency's legal mandate. In the two 
areas where FRONTEX primarily operates: (1) operational activities, and (2) risk 
analysis, the Agency has expanded their competences single-handedly. For 
instance, before FRONTEX got the legal approval of implementing Joint Return 
Operations (today a regular activity of the Agency which conducts a few dozen 
deportations per year) they were already coordinating the operations (Ibid.).  
The same goes for the collection and processing of personal data regarding 
migrants (Carrera et al. 2013: 347), which FRONTEX since then has developed 
their own procedure for handling (FRONTEX, 2014). The principle of gradually 
introducing an integrated border management seems to have been followed 
without legislative backing from the European Parliament. The EP, as the only 
directly publicly elected body within the Union, reacted sharply to the initiatives 
of FRONTEX. Firstly, the quantity of data processing was believed by the EP to 
increase risks of leakage. Secondly, they classified the type of data gathering 
FRONTEX involves in as personal intrusion (EP, 2014).  
 The Treaty of Lisbon (2009), that entered into force the year prior to the 
first rapid border intervention in Greece, envisaged an integrated border 
management at all external borders of the EU. The treaty consolidated the Treaty 
on the functioning of the European Union (1958) and the Treaty on the European 
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Union (1993). The treaty introduces the idea that border management shall 
gradually grow as an area dealt with on a supranational level. Roberta Mungianu 
(2013: 365) brings up the legal framing of the common border management 
strategy: Article 77 of the Treaty of Lisbon states (under the 1
st
 paragraph) that: 
“The Union shall develop a policy with a view to (...) the gradual introduction of 
an integrated management system for external borders.” [Emphasis added] (2013: 
365). This defines the goal of the common border policy for the Union. Following 
in the 2
nd
 paragraph it is stated that “any measure necessary [will be taken] for the 
gradual establishment of an integrated management system for external borders” 
(Ibid). The treaty of Lisbon embodies the political will for full integration of 
border management. FRONTEX has taken agency measures to exercise more 
control over border management (through their initiatives concerning joint 
operations and processing of personal data). Thereby the Agency has taken its 
own measures to assure the overarching goal in the Treaty of Lisbon. This 
corresponds to how neofunctionalism sees the gradual spillover of competence 
within the EU. As Haas argues (in Rosamond 2000: 62), tasks assigned to an 
institution (in this case authority) needs to be inherently expansive for spillover to 
occur. The treaty of Lisbon has introduced the overarching goal of an integrated 
border management, which in itself is a general mission assigned to actors within 
the EU dealing with border management (such as FRONTEX). In this it has 
overcome the opposition of Member States refusing a widening of its mandate, 
thus proving a high degree of inventiveness. What remains unclear is how the 
Agency has been able to bypass the legal framework. 
7.2 Incentives and voids within the legal framework 
The concept of integrated border management has lacked a clear definition as to 
which national and supranational authorities should be involved and to what 
extent (Mungianu 2013: 366). It has lead to initiatives from FRONTEX's side to 
expand the scope of their own activities. Functionality (Rosamond 2000: 57) 
assumes that a corps of technocrats will eventually take over more of the 
ideological work of politicians. Politics will according to Haas become more a 
matter of “managerial” tasks, political aims disappearing in favor of a strategy 
aimed at maximizing material needs in every policy sector. For instance, it could 
be striving for a single market by economic integration, or reducing irregular 
migration in the migration policy. Which method is more effective in providing 
for these needs is best known by experts and technocrats, not ideologues (Ibid.). 
This reasoning that forms one of the bases of neofunctionalist theory is applicable 
to how FRONTEX's mandate has evolved. Pollak and Slominski explain how the 
Agency has side-cut national political will and used the legal void that unclear 
legislation provides to expand their own governing of migration policy in a 
technocratic fashion, without having to face the scrutiny from either national or 
EU politicians (2009: 916). The material aims are in this case to decrease the 
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number of unwanted migrants that would put pressure on EU economies and 
welfare systems (cf. Roos 2013). 
How can it be possible, that FRONTEX governs and initiates its own activities 
without a prior legal review from the EU? The main explanatory factor is that the 
legislation which could restrain the Agency is obscure and open to interpretation. 
Although FRONTEX operates deploying personnel on the field, their missions are 
still phrased as being of an assisting and coordinating character. This study 
initially asked why FRONTEX has evolved without introducing a mechanism for 
accountability. A key to the answer lies in the limited mandate the Agency 
considers itself to have. FRONTEX points to how the expertise and technical 
equipment they are using complements in addition to Member States efforts. 
Since “regular border control is the exclusive responsibility of the Member 
States” (FRONTEX, 2015), the Agency has despite its participation pointed to the 
sovereign state as the main actor in operations.
2
 This discourse is having concrete 
results when it comes to accountability. When migrants' rights are disrespected, 
the actor held accountable is the Member State hosting a FRONTEX coordinated 
operation (Carrera et al. 2013: 352, 353). More exactly, FRONTEX officers in 
Joint Operations must respect national law, while also implementing the Agency's 
Operational Plan. Hence, this has become an argument to refer complaints of 
illegal deportations and push-backs to hosting Member States, for example in the 
case of the deployment of Rapid Border Intervention Teams in Greece in 2010 
(BBC 2010), or the Joint Operation HERA I, II and III off the Canary Islands 
(Human Rights Watch 2011).  
 It seems as if the FRONTEX administration consisting of public officials 
and experts have taken over governance of the organization. This is a shift from 
an ideologically driven policy from the Union towards a technocratically driven 
aim implemented by experts (Rosamond 2000: 56), striving for reduced 
migration. However, neofunctionalism also acknowledges the need for a political 
will within EU institutions to push integration in different policy areas (Ibid: 61-
62). The Treaty of Lisbon establishes an integrated border management as the 
general goal for common border policies. Can EU institutions push integration 
without the consent of Member States? In that case, it would have to be done with 
the creation of an agency that in some way bypasses both the authority of the EU 
level and the national level: since none of these actors have the power within the 
EU framework (due to the sovereignty of Member States being intact) to delegate 
supreme control over border management to an EU Agency. Pollak & Slominski 
holds that a short cut has been taken by FRONTEX, without a concrete transfer of 
authority from neither Member States nor the EU. Instead, a new form of 
administrative governance has been established with the aid of the unclear 
legislation (2009: 905). The Agency has acted independently of legislation and 
EU directives, but the legislation giving FRONTEX its autonomous position is 
written by the EU. The laws concerning the Agency have an imprecise and vague 
character because of the inadequate ability of EU legislators to provide a clear 
framework (Ibid.). With the undefined legal framework as a basis and a budget 
                                                 
2 
See 3 Setting the context: security and a decrease in migration for underlying discussion 
Lund University   STVA21 
Department of Political Science                                                                        Samuel Williams 
 
 19 
that has strikingly quadrupled from 2006 to 2008 (Ibid: 909), FRONTEX has been 
given the flexibility and the financial means to be an experimental actor in terms 
of activities.  
7.3 Spillover effect widening FRONTEX's mandate 
A clear linearity in EU migration policy integration appears when analyzing the 
2007 amendment to the FRONTEX Regulation. It was amended to give the 
Agency the authority to deploy Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABITs) (EC 
No 863/2007). The aim of common standards in border management remains. The 
Regulation (Ibid.) states that standardization is needed in order to assure another 
goal, which is already integrated as a common EU political project: the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice (hereinafter AFSJ) (Ibid.). The AFSJ is in turn one 
of the three main pillars of EU cooperation incorporated into the Treaty on the 
European Union (TEU) established in 1992. Operational cooperation is needed to 
achieve a secure AFSJ which requires standardized border management. Spillover 
is defined by neofunctionalists as “a situation in which a given action 
[standardization of border management], related to a specific goal [a secure 
AFSJ], creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking 
further actions [operational cooperation], which in turn create a further condition 
and a need for more action and so forth” [author's input] (Lindberg in Rosamond 
2000: 60). It is by the same logic that FRONTEX was founded, motivated by 
referring to the common rules adopted to secure the AFSJ (EC) (2) No 2007/2004. 
It is also following the same logic that the Agency got the power to initiate 
operations in the 2011 amendment to the regulation (EC) No 1168/2011. This 
shows how the expansions of the Agency's mandate are motivated in reference to 
overarching goals established in EU treaties.  
 For spillover to occur, there also needs to be a prior interdependence in the 
given policy area (Rosamond 2000: 60), such as established by the creation of an 
AFSJ in the EU where the norms established for security and border management 
relies on every country's successful implementation thereof. The power of 
operational cooperation (which will result in the setting up of RABITs) is 
motivated in terms of internal security for the entire AFSJ. In the EC Regulation 
863/2007 of 2007 as a means to achieve the common goal of internal security: 
“Effective management of the external borders through checks and surveillance 
helps to combat illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings and to 
prevent any threat to the internal security, public policy, public health and 
international relations of the Member States. Border control is in the interests not 
only of the Member State at whose external borders it is carried out but of all 
Member States which have abolished internal border control” [emphasis added] 
(EC (3) 863/2007). The Agency has become operational with the motivation of 
securing the AFSJ, creating a spillover that extends and deepens the Agency's 
mandate.  
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7.4 Member State interests and losses 
The responsibility and accountability is indeed held by Member States, firstly 
because Member States need to request the assistance of FRONTEX in the case of 
a RABIT intervention (Carrera & Guild 2010: 3), secondly since only Member 
States can be held accountable in practice in the case of human rights breaches as 
in the case of Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy. The latter is due to the fact that  
Member States personnel are employed in the field during Joint Operations, and 
therefore it is hard to direct any accusations of law-breaking past them towards 
the Agency (Carrera et al. 2013: 352). Some Member States have been accused 
more often than others for breaching human rights when it comes to implementing 
the EU's common standards, such as Italy and Greece (BBC 2006; Statewatch 
2013). Could the expansion of the FRONTEX mandate, with regard to a 
counterfactual approach, be seen as a way for certain Member States to evade 
responsibility to the EU for Human Rights breaches, while still achieving a 
decrease in incoming migrants to the Union? As Andrew Moravcsik argues: “'the 
primary source of integration lies in the interests of the states themselves and the 
relative power each brings to Brussels'” (in Rosamond 2000: 136). One of the 
most powerful Member States, France, has formerly had to face scrutiny due to 
their inaction in face of a boat in distress in the Mediterranean – holding migrants 
bound for the EU. France could be held accountable because national legislation 
applied to the case (Carrera et al. 2013: 354). Conversely, in the case of 
FRONTEX, this study has shown that the legal framework and official discourse 
denies responsibility in their operations – legislation cannot hold the Agency 
accountable. This proves intergovernmental ideas wrong, in the sense that even 
powerful states cannot dodge the responsibility to FRONTEX.  
 
7.5 State sovereignty compromised 
Cooperation in the immigration policy area experienced a stalemate throughout 
the 1990s and the early 2000s. Dead-locks were characterizing the negotiations, 
explained by the difficulty of handling the area of migration between sovereign 
states, in charge of their respective welfare systems and labor markets and 
therefore unwilling to let supranational power decide on border policies (Roos 
2013: 10). As Carrera et al. (2013: 343) argues, there has been an 
intergovernmental element of harmonization in EU migration policies, i.e., 
national governments have been partially reluctant to delegate power in the area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice in which FRONTEX operates. These difficulties 
reappeared when the idea to create an Agency to achieve integrated border 
management was first discussed. While the European Commission argued for an 
independent authority with the power to operate, most of the Member States were 
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reluctant and wanted to limit the Agency's mission to coordination and assistance 
only (Pollak & Slominski 2009: 907, 908). Roos holds that “Member States’ 
positions towards common EU immigration policies often tend towards measures 
that do not compromise their absolute sovereignty over the issue” (2013: 30). 
Haas explains that Member States in intergovernmental negotiations will strive for 
the lowest common denominator when it comes to cooperation (in Rosamond 
2000: 61). While these are valid claims, an overview of (1) The Agency's 
Regulation and amendments made to it, (2) The relevant treaties signed by 
Member States and, (3) information from joint operations coordinated by 
FRONTEX and hosted by Member States all point to a common denominator. 
The material suggests that Member States have kept their sovereignty only in the 
sense where it comes to taking responsibility for the human rights breaches 
occurring in operations at the external borders. Is there a choice? EU legislation 
(TEU) makes it impossible for Member States to coordinate border management 
intergovernmentally. Rather, they must always turn to the supranational authority 
FRONTEX in the case of an inflow of migrants that exceeds their own capacity 
(Mungianu 2013: 371). A clear example of this is the RABIT intervention in 
Greece in 2010 – 2011. Although the formal decision to ask for support at the 
external borders was for Greek authorities to make, they were encouraged by the 
European Commission to file a request to receive FRONTEX assistance (Human 
Rights Watch 2013). The formal decisions and responsibility for what happens at 
the borders thus remain with Member States, as in cases when migrants are ill-
treated (euobserver 2013). The treaties, that are signed by national governments,  
have assured some influence on EU legislation whereby it has kept some 
sovereignty with Member States, but FRONTEX as an Agency has been able to 
either bypass the legislated sovereignty, or use it in its defense. If Member States 
had expanded the mission of FRONTEX as a way to dodge responsibility to the 
EU for Human Rights breaches, it has not succeeded. 
Securitization of the policy area of migration has helped FRONTEX to define 
their mission as less politicized and more a matter of security (cf. Huysmans 
2000). For example this was the discourse adopted at the Hellenic border with 
regard to the RABIT intervention in 2010 – 2011 and in the case Hirsii Jamaa v. 
Italy. This is explained by neofunctionalists to be a sign of a foreign policy that is 
less political and more 'managerial' in its attributes, i.e. that when this area is 
depoliticized, it becomes a question of material and security aims (Rosamond 
2000: 57), such as reducing migration. A response that is framed as security does 
not have to deal with the political issues of sovereignty and who should have 
access to the nation – inherent in political debates about migration.  
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8. Final discussion 
This study initially asked the question: Why has FRONTEX evolved without 
introducing a mechanism for legal accountability? To answer this imminent 
question, a neofunctional theoretical framework has been employed. The concepts 
introduced by neofunctionalists: supranational (EU) power resulting in spillover 
and technocracy which is motivated by functionality have been explained and 
applied. Hence, can neofunctional theoretical concepts explain why FRONTEX's 
mandate has evolved without accountability?  
 The analysis has shown Member States' reluctance towards a fully 
integrated border management. This since an agency that has full responsibility 
for border management would naturally inflict upon state sovereignty. Since 
Member States have actively opposed FRONTEX to become fully operational, it 
has lead to the establishment of an agency regulated with an unclear legal 
framework. This legal framework has been used by the Agency to experiment 
beyond its legal mandate, widening the scope of existing tasks. However, as the 
analysis has also shown, this is part of the imminent strategy of the EU to 
gradually introduce an integrated border management. This idea of graduality (as 
introduced in the Treaty of Lisbon and Treaty on the European Union) has 
partially been implemented in practice by the Agency itself by introducing new 
competences. Thereby, the Agency has in their operational activities kept an 
official discourse of referring to Member States' legal mechanisms for 
accountability. Member state sovereignty and hence responsibility is kept in terms 
of discourse, but in practice FRONTEX has expanded to become a chief actor 
when it comes to the management of external borders (and the allegations of 
human rights breaches that follow).  
 This context makes it possible to understand why FRONTEX rejected the 
EU ombudsman Emily O'Reilly's demand in 2013 for an internal complaint 
mechanism. National resistance towards a fully operational agency has sanctioned 
the creation of an unclear legislation and the experimental mandate that follows. 
Neofunctionalism points out how the EU is mainly characterized by its 
technocracy since its aims are often material, and how public officials will prove 
efficient in assuring its material aims. The security discourse around the AFSJ and 
especially around border management has motivated the response to be highly 
material (reducing the number of irregular migrants). Firstly, FRONTEX has 
experimented in risk analysis and operational activities to assure this. This implies 
a public management with a strong power of initiation. The regulations that have 
followed to expand the Agency's mandate, has done so with arguments of 
functionality, creating a spillover effect widening the Agency's mandate. 
Generally this implies supranationality in border management (as defined in 
section 2.2 and in the neofunctional account). Specifically the indications of the 
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analysis are more complex. Firstly, it implies that the technocratic elements of the 
EU has served FRONTEX which incarnates a managerial approach to border 
management, whereby it has been possible to bypass concerns of Member States 
of interference with sovereignty. Thereby, this study has shown that the key to 
explaining FRONTEX's lack of accountability, lies in the supranational power the 
EU institutions have been allocated. However, secondly, a key to understanding 
this power also lies with the Member States, since they are the signatories of the 
treaties containing the imminent goals and the legislation which is unclear. The 
power of the EU lies rather in that the unclear mandate given to FRONTEX has 
been able to bypass legislation to reach the imminent goals. The EU has clearly 
stated objectives in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). What is not defined 
in the treaty was how and under what conditions an integrated border management 
will be implemented. The same lack of clarity beams through the Regulation 
deciding on FRONTEX's competences. Why the supranational organization (EU) 
is argued to be stronger is by the power of initiation and agenda-setting it has 
(through institutions such as the European Commission) which has led the Union 
to extend the Agency's mandate at the expense of Member States – which are 
consistently held accountable when operations are discovered to breach human 
rights.  
 This study has presented a clear example of how an EU agency with a 
high degree of technocracy and experimentation has evolved within a legal void 
and sometimes directly bypassing its legal mandate. It is clear that legal voids 
exist within the Unions treaties that are taken advantage of by at least one 
experimental agency. Nevertheless, it is necessary to ask what the technocratic 
fashion in which FRONTEX has evolved tell us about the EU? The support given 
to the neofunctional framework deserves further investigation. Further research 
could be conducted on other EU Agencies to establish whether neofunctional 
elements can be found elsewhere in the EU tree of institutions, Agencies and 
intergovernmental arrangements.  
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